HomeCoinsBitcoinHow Drivechains Introduce New Incentive Dynamics to Bitcoin

How Drivechains Introduce New Incentive Dynamics to Bitcoin

Regardless of a pleasant few months this summer season after Burak, notorious slayer of the Lightning Community, dropped his proposal for the brand new second layer protocol Ark the place individuals had loads of dialogue round completely different covenant proposals, drivechains are as soon as once more changing into a dominant subject of debate. There are a lot of issues with drivechains, from the rationale for supporting them, to claims about how they don’t have an effect on incentives being inaccurate, and even causes for why they might really damage miner revenue as a substitute of accelerating it. On this piece I’m going to focus solely on the problems relating to incentives for brevity’s sake.

If you’re not aware of the precise technical workings of BIPs 300 and 301, you’ll be able to learn a succinct abstract of that right here.

Separation of Considerations: Mainchain Miners and Sidechain “Miners”

One of many core claims from drivechain proponents is that the activation of this BIP introduces no new necessities or prices for miners who take part in securing these sidechains. Whereas that is strictly technically true, it doesn’t require or mandate something new from miners, the incentives of the design naturally create a funnel motivating miners to tackle full accountability for operation of those sidechains themselves to maximise revenue. Over time as a result of aggressive nature of mining, this could ultimately make miners working sidechain nodes and dealing with block development themselves to keep up their financial competitiveness.

The design of blind merge mining (BMM) in BIP 301 specifies a mechanism for customers who don’t interact in Bitcoin mining to overtly bid within the mempool for miners to pick their sidechain block for affirmation. For miners to just accept a selected bid from some sidechain “miner” they have to embrace an identical dedication to deciding on their block of their coinbase transaction. The consensus guidelines of the proposal make any bid transactions from sidechain miners invalid except the corresponding message is included within the coinbase. This each ensures that miners can not declare funds from a sidechain miner except they really affirm their sidechain block. It additionally prevents them from claiming funds from a number of sidechain miners whereas solely commiting to one among their sidechain blocks.

The proposal is designed this fashion with the objective of permitting miners to gather income from sidechains with out having to really validate them or contain themselves in establishing blocks for the sidechains. In keeping with proponents, sidechain miners will merely bid the charges paid to mainchain miners as much as be virtually the whole thing of the sidechain’s earnings, and miners will seize ~99% of the worth with out having to do something. This assertion utterly glosses over the truth and nuances of the incentives concerned on this association.

It’s often claimed that “anyone can participate in constructing sidechain blocks.” This isn’t true. Whereas it’s an open course of to take part in, it isn’t free. It requires capital within the type of bitcoin to really be a sidechain miner, and this capital requirement grows in proportion to the expansion in price income generated by a selected sidechain. So if a sidechain generates solely 0.0001 BTC per block, it will likely be a really open course of that just about anybody can take part in. However let’s say that sidechain generates 1 BTC in charges every block, that may be a very completely different sport. Additionally, the withdrawal interval for a drivechain is three months; that’s roughly 90 days earlier than you’ll be able to really withdraw something you’ve got earned, so at 1 BTC per block with 144 blocks in a day as much as 12,960 BTC are required to pay miners for confirming sidechain blocks. Take into accout in principle it is a aggressive factor, in order that price will likely be break up between all of the profitable sidechain miners, however that’s nonetheless an enormous quantity of capital (only for one sidechain). Even a extra modest 0.1 BTC continues to be 1,296 BTC in that interval.

This brings me to the crux of the issue. Do you actually suppose that almost all of the charges collected on a sidechain are going to be paid to miners? Folks will collectively half with and put in danger over 1200 BTC in a 3 month interval simply to have a shot at incomes a piece of 12 BTC? The whole rationale for miners by no means having to do something is that ~99% of accessible income will likely be given to miners as a consequence of aggressive pressures, and it’ll not be well worth the 1% reward to mine the sidechain’s themselves. That 12 BTC represents the 1% left over. Over 1200 BTC is in danger for the potential reward of 12 BTC. If that assumption is flawed, and sidechain miners that aren’t additionally mainchain miners won’t spend that quantity of capital for that low of a return, then there’s a a lot larger % that mainchain miners aren’t capturing on the desk. The one technique to seize it in that scenario will likely be to change into a sidechain miner themselves too. Miner’s complete incentive is to maximise revenue, leaving vital revenue on the desk will encourage them to seize it. And right here’s the ultimate kicker: miners don’t must have and spend that BTC capital up entrance with a purpose to mine the sidechain, they only have to stay a dedication to a sidechain block of their coinbase. For the miners themselves that’s free.

The idea of how a lot of the charges will likely be paid to mainchain miners being flawed primarily creates an incentive spiral that results in the very same kind of mining centralization stress conventional merge mining or one thing like a blocksize improve would create. In different phrases, it means the declare about BMM fixing mining centralization is fake.

Second Layer Charge Sniping

One of many sport theoretical considerations with Bitcoin long run is a matter referred to as price sniping. Submit block subsidy when most of miners’ income comes from charges, when irregular price spikes happen, miners really do have an incentive to carry out quick reorg assaults and struggle over blocks that gather these abnormally excessive charges. Proper now if an enormous price spike happens miners can all the time depend on the block subsidy within the subsequent block even when they missed out on that price spike. As that subsidy disappears and miners rely on the variance of the price market alone to pay the payments, exaggerated sufficient spikes in charges change the equation and make it value reorging (or redoing work) for a time to struggle over that exaggerated revenue. This may make sense till the price of redoing work on the identical block time and again with no reward collected approaches the purpose of being an financial loss, after which miners would rationally stop the struggle.

The best way that drivechains BMM specification works modifications the dynamic of this. In conventional merge mining you would need to reorg the mainchain with a purpose to reorg a sidechain. In drivechains you don’t. The identical method that mainchain blocks have a pointer again to the earlier block, drivechains do as nicely. The factor is, you don’t need to take away a dedication to a sidechain block with a purpose to level to a distinct one. Have a look at this instance under, the numbers in parentheses are the blocks the present one is pointing again to:

A sidechain block when utilizing drivechains is simply one thing dedicated to within the mainchain, and whereas the mainchain goes marching ahead with out going again, the sidechain can commute between a number of forks. The sidechain software program continues to be following a longest chain rule (which miners are trusted to respect), however not like the mainchain reorgs these blocks don’t simply disappear. The dedication to them nonetheless exists within the mainchain, and nonetheless must be scanned.

So what does this need to do with price sniping? Every little thing. For miners to price snipe on a sidechain it doesn’t require redoing work, it doesn’t require giving up the mainchain charges (and even charges from different sidechains). So when that sidechain miner collects twice the charges as regular and solely pays the mainchain miners what they usually do, a mainchain miner can come alongside and reorg that block on the sidechain and gather the sidechain charges whereas the miner who acquired cash on chain for the unique model of that sidechain block nonetheless retains that price. So the unique sidechain miner earns nothing, and loses what they paid in mainchain charges. So one miner can feesnipe with out the primary miner dropping what they earned. If a miner will get fortunate, the identical miner may even double gather the unique price on the mainchain and the sidechain charges by reorging it in the event that they mine two blocks in a row. Solely the sidechain miner who doesn’t mine on the mainchain loses cash on this scenario, and since they don’t even have hashrate there may be nothing they’ll do about it.

Now to ensure that the mainchain miner to efficiently pull this off, the sidechain miners need to construct on their block as a substitute of the unique. If a pool is sufficiently big, they’ve first rate odds of simply discovering the subsequent block themselves, the place after all they are going to construct on their very own block. They might even overtly bid like a sidechain-only miner to extend their odds. This may require paying an precise mainchain price, however the preliminary reorg was free. Different miners may even simply construct on the reorg block as a substitute of the unique as a result of it’s more moderen, these particulars come all the way down to how the precise software program implementation swimming pools deploy is constructed.

Total although there’s a giant asymmetry in threat between sidechain-only miners and mainchain miners in relation to sidechain reorgs. Mainchain miners who’ve a sidechain block reorged from them undergo the chance price of dropping further potential income, sidechain-only miners really lose cash they already had. And all of this happens and not using a reorg disruption to the mainchain itself. It is a huge drawback, and disincentive, for sidechain-only miners to take part on this course of.

Even eradicating sidechain-only miners from the image, this dynamic change nonetheless exists in a scenario with solely mainchain miners. If we take a look at mainchain miners doing this to one another although, the truth is it’s going to possible fall into equilibrium the place everybody isn’t reaching optimum earnings, however larger than they’d with out sidechains. Some may query whether or not that might prevail provided that 26% of miners can cease all pegout transactions from sidechains, and that the tail finish of swimming pools may achieve this in protest of disproportionate advantages for bigger swimming pools. All that might accomplish is to create an natural incentive for almost all of miners who stand to realize from the withdrawal going by way of to orphan the mainchain blocks of the miners stalling it. So whereas this nonetheless disproportionately advantages bigger swimming pools who will statistically discover a number of blocks in a row extra typically, smaller swimming pools have an incentive to just accept it. This dynamic is yet one more centralizing stress for miners by itself, and likewise one more reason the incentives push the association in the direction of miners validating and mining these sidechains themselves.


Miner Extractable Worth is changing into an enormous drawback, significantly within the ETH ecosystem. MEV is any kind of technique to revenue the place the miners/stakers/and many others. have an uneven benefit over everybody else in amassing that revenue. Sometimes that is achieved by way of controlling the order of transactions in a block, akin to trades interacting with a DEX contract, however in summary that isn’t strictly vital. The revenue margin that sidechain-only miners maintain for themselves mentioned above is itself a really primary type of MEV, it’s worth sitting on the desk that miners have a bonus in having the ability to declare. This type of MEV just isn’t very sophisticated, costly to research, and is well extractable by mainchain miners merely working primary sidechain software program.

Let’s take a look at a transaction ordering type of MEV, like a DEX on ETH. Decentralized Alternate protocols permit non-custodial buying and selling of property between buying and selling events utilizing a wise contract as a mediator. It atomically fulfills either side of the commerce, or none. The factor is although, if you can also make a revenue in making such a commerce, the one technique to gather it’s if miners embrace that transaction in a block. And the straightforward reality of broadcasting that transaction offers miners the within scoop on out there revenue earlier than it’s really confirmed in a block. This provides them the chance to entrance run you and gather these earnings for themselves. A sidechain-only miner participating in such actions would possible be capable to bid a lot increased than different sidechain miners, getting a lot nearer to 100% of the price rewards straight out there in that block. Nonetheless, in doing so that they sign to mainchain miners that a chance for even larger revenue exists. Provided that F2Pool is presently enjoying MEV video games entrance working different Stacks individuals, Luxor bought and is constructing out Ordinalshub, miners trying to generate new streams of income is a reality of actuality and never a hypothetical. That is yet one more incentive for miners to change into sidechain miners themselves.

However the MEV threat doesn’t cease there with simply extra miner centralization threat. There are conditions the place miners can not simply simply seize the MEV worth themselves. Say an organization or group ran a entrance finish for an enormous DEX to make it simpler to make use of (virtually each DEX on ETH has such gamers), and sourced the person orders earlier than they even hit the mempool and privately constructed a block to bid for to mainchain miners. Mainchain miners wouldn’t be capable to examine the contents of this block till after it was confirmed and propagated between sidechain nodes, so they are going to be incapable of frontrunning within the mempool to extract this worth, they must really reorg and feesnipe the sidechain. This clearly would damage the sidechain miner working the DEX entrance finish and the mainchain miner will be double paid, however the mainchain miner can by no means really extract this worth himself entrance working the mempool as a result of the precious transactions by no means enter it. And by reorging and placing the sidechain miner/DEX entrance finish operator out of enterprise, they’re destroying that supply of worth. That’s a extra concerned effort, and extra divergent from their predominant enterprise of simply working nodes, or selectively changing issues they see of their mempool.

There are additionally conditions the place mainchain miners extracting MEV is actually unimaginable. Think about a sidechain spun up particularly to facilitate funds for items on Amazon, or combine with some Amazon cloud service. The oblique new income this sidechain’s existence may generate is actually solely capturable by Amazon. For miners to extract that worth, they’d actually need to construct an organization that might out of date and substitute Amazon. That’s simply not occurring.

So ultimately not solely do MEV dangers on drivechains exacerbate incentives for mainchain miners to straight take part in them, it additionally has the potential for introducing exterior affect into mining incentives. What if Amazon solely shared its MEV worth with the few greatest swimming pools? It could incentivize miners to change to them to earn a minimize. It offers them a level of direct affect over miners income streams.

However Merge Mining Already Exists

That is the frequent response to those considerations: merge mining already exists. Sure, it does, however for freely valued shitcoins. Namecoin is the frequent instance introduced up, however Namecoin represents primarily nothing in proportion phrases of miners revenue. Quite a few SHA256 cash have been merge mined with Bitcoin, virtually none of them are anymore as a result of their value crashed to the purpose of it not being well worth the effort. That’s the empirical historic pattern right here. These techniques observably don’t pose wherever close to the identical incentive threat as a coin pegged to Bitcoin, that can’t merely independently crash in value to the purpose that it’s not value involving your self with.

Some individuals may carry up federations, however the actuality is nobody appears to have curiosity in utilizing federated sidechain pegs. They generate no demand, the place there appears to be loads of clambering for a drivechain hashrate escrow peg. That might basically alter the equation right here and create demand giant sufficient to trigger damaging incentive distortions the place they in any other case wouldn’t exist. On the opposite facet, mining swimming pools establishing a federation would provide no actual dynamic membership to who controls the cash (as the present keyholders must explicitly add new members and switch cash), and positive aspects no actual worth from being merge mined. It’s also one thing mining swimming pools that begin it may run independently of precise miners, i.e. if 100% of hashrate left mining swimming pools that began a federation, the swimming pools with no hashrate may nonetheless function it. They might signal blocks, and any prior merge mined scheme is actually meaningless as a result of the swimming pools management the cash on chain. It’s primarily only a federation like Liquid that has some phantasm of an overlap with mining at that time.

So, the massive claims relating to drivechains are that mainchain miners shouldn’t have to care about them, and that they don’t alter mining incentives in any method. I’ve laid out the most important (however under no circumstances all) of the arguments displaying they do the truth is alter them in very substantial methods. These prices needs to be one thing critically thought of when considering this proposal, as regardless of the declare by many drivechain advocates, they’re very actual.

Supply: https://bitcoinmagazine.com/technical/drivechains-introduce-new-incentive-dynamics-to-bitcoin


Payday Lenders Are Utilizing AI Algorithms: However Is This Good Or Unhealthy?

In a day and age the place our monetary transactions are more and more carried out digitally, the function of synthetic intelligence is certain to...

The Way forward for Bitcoin: Improvements, Challenges, and Alternatives

Bitcoin, the pioneering cryptocurrency, has regularly developed since its inception in 2009. As the primary decentralized digital foreign money, it has paved the best way...

ETH, SOL rise as crypto traders eye Solciety (SLCTY)

ETH and SOL costs jumped above $3,300 and $150 on Monday as cryptocurrencies rose.The upside follows an tried assassination of Donald Trump.As cryptocurrencies...

Zetly: Breakthrough in fan engagement and the economic system of sports activities, because of the NFT

This publish is a visitor contribution by Zetly All in One Sport Fan Engagement NFT Platform. Keep up to date with Zetly and get details about...

Most Popular

Please enter CoinGecko Free Api Key to get this plugin works.